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Abstract
This paper experimentally studies the influence of aspirations on choice. Motivated by the
theoretical model of Guney et al. (2015), we consider choice problems which may include
unavailable alternatives. In a choice problem, an aspiration is the most desired alternative there
(available or not). In our design, we endogenously derive both aspirations and a subjective
similarity notion that operates between an aspiration and other alternatives. We find that (i)
choice reversals are more likely when an unavailable aspiration alternative is added into the
environment than when an unavailable non-aspiration alternative is added, (ii) an available
option is more likely to be chosen when there is an unavailable aspiration that is similar to it
compared to when there is no such option in the environment, (iii) choices are better explained
by a similarity-based procedure when the similarity notion that is endogenously derived in a
separate part of the experiment is used rather than the Euclidean metric.
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1 Introduction
People possess aspirations regarding almost every aspect of life ranging from consumption (e.g.
luxury products) to partner search (e.g. ideal mate). Moreover, as also pointed out in Hedgcock
et al. (2009), preferred options might often be unavailable. This unavailability may stem from
a variety of sources: in a standard consumer setting, a product might be simply unaffordable or
sold out; in a political context, a candidate may exit the race; and in marketing, companies may
pre-announce products which are not yet available on the market. The fact that aspirations may
sometimes be unavailable does not prevent them from having an impact on agents’ decisions. Our
goal in this paper is to experimentally investigate this impact on choice behavior.
Consider the following anecdotal example to illustrate what we mean by an aspiration and how
we think it may influence choices. Say, a customer enters a shoe store, looks at all the shoes set
out in the store, and finds a pair she likes best. We think of that pair as her current aspiration
since it is her ideal pair in the store and she would choose it absent any restrictions. But, what if
her size is sold-out or the pair is unaffordable for her? In such a circumstance, the customer may
then look for an available pair that is similar to her unavailable aspiration. There is no guarantee,
however, that the most similar pair will be the same as the available pair that gives her the highest
utility. Therefore, unattainable aspirations, by promoting a similarity-based choice behavior, may
very well lead the decision maker to behave in a way that cannot be explained by the standard
theory. Indeed, the marketing and psychology literatures present some indirect evidence for such
effects. It is found that choice shares1 of the two alternatives change significantly depending on
whether or not a third alternative that is “highly desirable” but unavailable exists in the choice
environment (Farquhar and Pratkanis (1992, 1993), Highhouse (1996), and Pettibone and Wedell
(2000)). When such an option exists, the choice share of the alternative “similar” to it is observed
to increase significantly.
In a choice environment where some of the observed alternatives are unavailable, we think of an
aspiration as the alternative that the decision maker would choose, i.e. the agent’s first best option,
if all alternatives in that choice problem were available.2 Thus, an agent’s aspiration varies with
the available and unavailable alternatives that she faces, as in the case of different aspirations in
different shoes stores. Additionally, the aspiration in a choice environment is the agent’s universally
best alternative only when the universally best option is present in the choice environment, which
typically is not the case.
Notice that different agents may form different aspirations in the same environment. How-
ever, studies in the psychology and marketing literatures typically work with “highly desirable”
alternatives that are uniform across all agents rather than specific to each agent. For example, a
highly desirable option might be considered as an alternative with the highest liking rating aver-
1The choice share of an alternative in a set is the percentage of agents who choose it from that set.
2When all alternatives are available, an agent’s aspiration is the alternative that she chooses. In the case of
unavailability, our definition of aspiration imposes no restriction on when a decision maker learns about the unavail-
ability of alternatives. The shoe store example is consistent with our definition both when the set of unavailable
shoes is revealed to the customer at the outset or later.
2
aged across all subjects (Min 2003) or an exogenously introduced alternative that asymmetrically
dominates one of the two other options which have equal choice shares initially (Pettibone and
Wedell (2000)). Neither method guarantees that the candidate option is an aspiration for each
individual. This makes it impossible to distinguish whether the observed impact is due to the
unavailable alternative being an aspiration or perhaps just due to the presence of an unavailable
alternative.
Another issue in most studies in the literature is that the “similarity” (distance) between options
is determined by an objective measure (e.g. the Euclidean distance), which depends on options’
physical characteristics. Yet, in reality, the Euclidean distance may not coincide with a decision
maker’s notion of similarity or serve as an appropriate proxy. For example, Euclidean distance
between pairs of a black leather and a brown suede shoes is not meaningful since color and material
are attributes that cannot be naturally represented in the Euclidean space. Additionally, agents’
perceptions of distance may be subjective and thus, the similarity between any two options may
not be perceived the same by all as opposed to the literature where typically the same distance
function is assumed to be employed by each subject.
Motivated by both real life circumstances and the indirect evidence in the literature, we study
the effects of possibly unavailable aspirations on choice through an individual decision making
experiment that is free of the issues above. Our aim is twofold. First, we explore whether unavailable
aspirations really affect choices. Second, we examine whether unavailable aspirations act on choices
through the channel of a subjective similarity notion. More specifically, using well-defined measures
of endogenously determined aspirations and similarity notions, we aim to answer the following
questions: (1) Do unavailable aspirations affect choices by leading to choice reversals and how do
the effects of unavailable aspirations and unavailable options that are not aspirations compare?
(2) How does the presence of an unavailable aspiration influence the odds that the most similar
option is chosen? (3) Which of the subjective and Euclidean distance can better explain the
tendency to choose the option closest to the unavailable aspiration?
To address these questions, we design an experiment that is composed of two parts. Part 1
contains choice tasks where either all options are available or some options are displayed with
an “unavailable” tag and are unchoosable. In Part 2, we use a variation of the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (1964) mechanism to derive, for each subject, a willingness to exchange price. We
interpret this price as a subjective distance that reveals how similar an agent perceives her aspiration
is to other options.
Our experimental results show that a significant number of choice reversals, i.e. an agent
changing her choice, occur when an unavailable alternative deemed as an aspiration is introduced
into the environment. Moreover, we find that the odds of choice reversal are significantly higher
when the introduced unavailable option is an aspiration compared to the case when it is not.
These two findings, taken together, provide evidence that unavailable aspirations influence agents’
choice behavior. Additionally, we find that the odds that the alternative subjectively closest to the
unavailable aspiration is chosen increase significantly when the unavailable aspiration is present in
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the environment relative to the case it is not. Furthermore, compared with the Euclidean distance
function that is widely used in earlier studies, the subjective distance function we derive for each
individual better explains the tendency to choose the option closest to the unavailable aspiration.
The last two findings provide support for a subjective similarity-based choice behavior.
The role of preferred unavailable options is of substantial practical interest. As also pointed
out in Farquhar and Pratkanis (1992), it is not difficult for firms or policy makers to introduce
unavailable products that would act as aspirations for people. Such options may have a significant
impact on choice behavior and thus may potentially be used by marketers and policy makers who
may want to strategically introduce unavailable options to affect people’s choice behavior. For the
examples of the use of unavailable options as propaganda devices in various persuasion and decision
making settings, see Farquhar and Pratkanis (1992).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a quick literature review.
Section 3 explains the theoretical background. Section 4 presents the experimental design. Section
5 explains hypotheses and how the design can distinguish among alternative theories. Section 6
gives the main results. Section 7 concludes. In Appendix I (Section 8), additional analyses for
the main results and details about the main experiment’s design are provided. In Appendix II
(Section 9), two extensions are presented: (i) the timing of unavailability is varied, (ii) the setting
of choice problems is extended so that either the number of attributes in alternatives or the number
of (un)available alternatives is greater.
2 Related Literature
An alternative that exists in the choice environment but is unavailable at the time of choice is called
a phantom in the literature. A phantom alternative is not necessarily highly desirable and effects
of such phantoms on choice are analyzed in numerous experimental studies. For instance, Doyle
et al. (1999) find that the attraction effect (Huber et al. (1982)) is still observed even when the
asymmetrically dominated option is a phantom while Ge et al. (2009) show that the compromise
effect (Simonson (1989)) continues to exist when the extreme option is unavailable. These effects
differ from the aspirational effects studied in the present paper. Because an aspiration refers to
a superior alternative that is chosen uniquely whenever available. In contrast, an extreme option
is not necessarily an aspiration and when agents have monotonic preferences, an asymmetrically
dominated option can never be an aspiration.
Another line of research studies the effects of phantom options that are highly desirable. Even
though these phantoms are suggested to be “superior” alternatives, as discussed earlier, superiority
for each subject is indeed no guarantee and also, subjective measures of similarity are not allowed.
Our work differs from previous literature in that, taking its base from a theory, both aspirations and
distance measures are formally defined and derived endogenously in our experiment for each agent
through incentive compatible mechanisms. In contrast to most of the studies in the literature which
use a between subject analysis and compare relative choice shares in the absence and presence of a
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reference alternative, we study these effects in a within subject analysis and look at choice reversals
at an individual level. However, one aspect where our paper agrees with the earlier work is that
alternatives in our choice problems can naturally be viewed as members of a standard Euclidean
space.3 Thus, we are able to compare the performance of the subjective distance functions with
that of the Euclidean metric, which is frequently used in previous studies.
There is a strand of literature where the effects of aspirations have been experimentally studied
in various contexts (such as risky choice and group decision making) under a quite different in-
terpretation of aspirations (Simon (1955), Harnett (1967), Payne et al. (1980, 1981)). Informally,
they define an aspiration to be a subjective threshold and any outcome below is considered to be
a failure while any outcome above to be a success. This contrasts significantly with the current
paper where we consider an aspiration in a given choice setting to be the alternative that yields
the highest utility if the decision maker were to face no unavailability restrictions. Put differently,
we consider aspiration more of an ideal that the decision maker is dreaming about rather than a
threshold.
Finally, the theoretical implications of aspirations are also studied in other settings. For ex-
ample, Bendor et al. (1995, 2001), Karandikar et al. (1998), Cho and Matsui (2005) study the
effects of aspirations on players’ strategy choices; Genicot and Ray (2014) incorporate aspirations
in the study of economic issues like investment, mobility, inequality, and the poverty trap; and
Guney et al. (2015) apply their aspiration-based choice model to study the difference between pre-
and post-promotion consumption amounts of a good and conformity behavior in networks. These
studies highlight the possible implications of aspirations in various settings and emphasize the need
for a better understanding of aspirations experimentally as well.
3 Theoretical Background
According to the classical theory in economics, each agent has a utility function and when con-
fronted with a set of available alternatives, she chooses the available alternative that maximizes her
utility. However, violations of the classical theory have been observed in experimental studies and a
reference point is one of the most frequent reason for such violations. It is known that an agent who
chooses an alternative a over b in the absence of a reference point might choose b over a in the pres-
ence of a reference alternative. This cannot be explained by the standard theory. To explain such
behavior, various reference-dependent choice theories have been proposed. Some of these theories
consider a reference point in a general sense (Tverksy and Kahneman (1991), Ko¨szegi and Rabin
(2006)) while others study the effect of a specific reference point such as aspirations (Rubinstein
and Zhou (1999), Guney et al. (2015)) and status quos (Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014), Ok et
al. (2014), Riella and Teper (2014)).
3The way alternatives are defined in Euclidean space slightly differs in earlier studies and the present one. A
typical alternative in previous research is a good defined by a combination of several attributes mostly expressed as
a numerical value (e.g. a car defined by its price as well as ride quality). Our study uses a bundle of several goods
as a typical option (e.g. 4 bars of chocolate and 3 folders is a bundle).
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Guney et al.’s (2015) aspiration-based choice (ABC) theory is the most closely related theoretical
work. Following a revealed preference approach, they suggest a model of how aspirations arise and
affect choices. Formally, they extend the basic choice theory setup by taking a choice problem to
be a pair of sets (S, Y ) with S ⊆ Y , where both sets are subsets of the grand space X. They
offer the interpretation that Y is the collection of alternatives the decision maker observes in the
environment and S is the set of alternatives that are available to her among them. Thus, confronted
with a choice problem, this agent can choose alternatives from S only, i.e. C(S, Y ) ⊆ S. In the
earlier shoe store example, the set of all shoes in the world can be considered as X, the set of all
shoes set out in the store as Y and the ones that are available in her size as S. Pairs of shoes that
are set out in the store but not available for the agent to choose, that’s Y \S, are referred to as
phantoms.
Imposing axioms on choices, Guney et al. (2015) characterize a choice procedure that is based
on two endogenously derived parameters over the grand space: a (strict) preference relation  that
reveals the agent’s reference-free preference over any two alternatives and a distance function d that
reflects how she perceives dissimilarity between any two alternatives. When faced with a choice
problem (S, Y ), the decision maker first forms her aspiration a(Y ) by maximizing her preference
relation  over Y and then chooses the alternatives in S that are closest to her aspiration with
respect to her distance function d. Thus,
C(S, Y ) = argmin
s∈S
d(s, a(Y )) for every choice problem (S, Y ).
ABC theory, recognizing that a decision maker’s perception of similarity is personal, formu-
lates a representation based upon a subjective distance notion. Guney et al. (2015) first derive
a set of aspiration-dependent utility functions and then construct the distance function so that
the distance between any two alternatives is ordinally equivalent to the difference between their
aspiration-dependent utilities, given the aspiration. Formally, for any two alternatives x and b such
that b  x,
d(x, b) ≈ Ub(b)− Ub(x)
where d is the distance function, Ub is the aspiration-dependent utility of an alternative when
the agent has the aspiration b.4
The predictions of ABC theory are as follows: (i) the agent chooses her aspiration uniquely
whenever it is available, i.e. a(Y ) ∈ S ⇒ C(S, Y ) = a(Y ), (ii) when the aspiration is unavailable,
the agent chooses the available alternative that is closest to her aspiration (and this closest available
alternative might be different than the available option with the highest utility), (iii) the subjectively
derived distance better explains the choice data than an exogenously given distance function, (iv)
the agent can exhibit choice reversals5 upon the introduction of an unavailable option into the
4This theory guarantees the following property which is also very well-aligned with intuition: When an alternative
is the aspiration, its aspiration-dependent utility is higher for itself than any other lower-ranked alternative, i.e.
Ub(b) ≥ Ub(x) for any x and b such that b is preferred over x.
5Formally, a choice reversal is said to occur when C(S, S) 6= C(S, Y ) for some S, Y such that S ⊆ Y .
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environment when that option serves as an aspiration but her choice must remain the same (hence,
no reversals) when the added unavailable option is not an aspiration. In a weaker form, this
prediction can be also formulated as the amount of choice reversals due to the introduction of an
unavailable aspiration must be greater than the reversals due to the introduction of a non-aspiration
alternative.
In a choice problem (S, Y ), an agent’s aspiration is drawn from Y and this is an important
feature that disciplines the model. If the aspiration were formed more broadly by being drawn
from a varying larger set that might include alternatives unobserved to an outsider (such as the
shoes seen through advertisements or searches prior to visiting the shop Y in our earlier motivating
example), then all predictive power of the above model would be lost because the “true” Y could
vary significantly across choice problems. If aspirations were formed more narrowly by being drawn
from the set S of feasible elements, then the model would impose too much discipline and reduce to
the rational choice model.6 By requiring the aspiration to be derived from the set Y , ABC theory
aims to find a compromise which allows deviations from rationality while retaining predictive power
to some extent.
Notice also that while ABC theory is a model of not fully rational agents, the reason need not
be due to cognitive limitations. In fact, agents perform two optimization procedures (maximizing
 and minimizing d). The interpretation of ABC theory is rather procedural; it suggests a way in
which agents may make decisions when faced with desired unavailable alternatives.
Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) also study a distance minimization procedure which selects the
closest alternative to an exogenously determined reference point. Given that their model allows
for unavailable reference points and the reference option is chosen whenever it is available, the
reference point in their model can also be interpreted as an aspiration. However, references in their
model are exogenously given whereas Guney et al. (2015) recognizes the subjectivity of aspirations
and derives them endogenously. In contrast to ABC model, Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) do not
allow for the absence of a reference point. Moreover, they restrict the grand alternative space
and the distance function to be Euclidean. While Guney et al.’s (2015) ABC theory allows for
Euclidean space and distance function, it also allows for choice situations where alternatives cannot
be naturally expressed as Euclidean and the distance notions in agents’ minds are subjective and
do not necessarily coincide with the Euclidean distance.
Another particular reference point frequently studied in the literature is a status quo (Masatli-
oglu and Ok (2005, 2014), Ok et al. (2014), Riella and Teper (2014)). There are two typical
features of status quo-based choice theories in the literature: (i) a status quo is always assumed to
be available and therefore choosable in a choice problem, (ii) the agent first rules out all alterna-
tives that are inferior to the status quo and then makes a choice from the remaining set of options.
6Another possibility may be that Y consists of all alternatives that the agent has observed until her time of choice.
Given our experimental design, this would imply that Y is equal to the grand set of alternatives in the experiment
(plus alternatives previously observed outside the experiment). In this scenario, Y would not vary across choice
problems and hence, the theory would again predict rational behavior. As will be seen, rational behavior is ruled our
by our choice data.
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In contrast to the availability assumption in these theories, aspirations in reality are frequently
unattainable and therefore cannot be chosen. As modeled in Guney et al. (2015), aspirations lead
to deviations from rationality only when unavailable. Furthermore, aspirations are by definition al-
ternatives which are superior to all available alternatives and a procedure which requires all inferior
options to be eliminated would result in choosing nothing whenever an aspiration is unavailable.
One of the most well-accepted theories of a general reference point is Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1999) loss aversion model. Unlike Guney et al. (2015), Tverksy and Kahneman (1991) concentrate
on a more restricted choice domain, namely Euclidean space, and study reference points that are
exogenously given and not necessarily the most desired options as in the case of aspirations. They
model loss averse behavior where gains and losses are determined according to a reference point
and losses loom larger than gains. Different from Guney et al. (2015), this theory does not allow
for reference-free choice situations. Even though one can suggest designating a neutral reference
point (such as (0, 0) in the Euclidean space) to represent a no reference situation, this results in
situations that are incompatible with aspirations. As shown in Masatlioglu and Ok (2014), Tversky
and Kahneman’s (1991) general non-constant loss aversion model over a large enough domain must
necessarily lead to a situation where an agent chooses an alternative a over b when there is no
reference point, but chooses b over a when a is the reference point.7 This behavior is against the idea
of an “aspiration” which is a highly desirable alternative that is selected whenever it is available.
In contrast, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) constant loss aversion model does not suffer from
the above behavior, but cannot explain some specific choice patterns in our experimental design
that ABC theory can. Details on such patterns are provided in Section 5 where we introduce our
hypotheses and ways to distinguish among alternative explanations, given our experimental design.
Finally, Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) suggest a model of reference-dependent preferences. They
consider agents with loss averse utility functions (Tverksy and Kahneman (1991)) and endogenously
derived expectations serve as reference points there. In a single agent model, they define an equilib-
rium notion where the agent’s rational expectations are consistent with the optimal behavior given
the expectations. According to their model, gain-loss utility influences behavior in the presence
of uncertainty but in deterministic environments behavior reduces to the rational choice. This is
different from Guney et al. (2015) where aspirations can result in deviations from rationality in
deterministic environments.
As we discussed earlier, aspirations in reality are formed by individuals themselves rather than
being exogenously given. Hence, they are subjective. Aspirations of an individual in a choice
situation need not be the same as the aspirations of another person in the same choice environment.
This necessitates the endogenous derivation of aspirations if one aims to understand their effects.
Second, in experimental studies, a distance or similarity notion is suggested as a channel through
which aspirations might influence choices. An observation from real life suggests that these notions
could be very different from objective measures and might vary from one person to another. Hence,
7A non-constant loss-averse utility refers to a utility function that is concave in the gain domain and convex in
the loss domain whereas a constant loss-averse utility is linear in both the gain and loss domains.
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a study aiming to test this similarity channel should derive the distance function endogenously.
Given that Guney et al. (2015) is the only study combining such desired features, we take it as our
starting point and base our experimental design on it.
Note that our purpose here is not to test each axiom of Guney et al.’s (2015) ABC theory
separately. We rather explore the overall behavior jointly characterized by their axioms and focus on
testing the implications which we believe are the most critical. More specifically, we are interested in
whether unavailable aspirations can lead to choice reversals as allowed by their theory and whether
choices can be viewed as if arising from the minimization of a subjective distance given that the
reference points are the endogenously determined aspirations as modeled in ABC theory. One
needs to be cautious here as we test an “as if” argument. We don’t claim that subjects actually use
the distance minimization procedure ABC model suggests. Indeed, subjects might have different
distance notions or more broadly formed references in their minds, or they might even apply different
procedures which happen to give rise to the choices we observe in the experiment. We rather say
that a significant amount of choices observed in the experiment can be viewed as if agents use the
aspiration choice procedure with the distance notion derived in Part 2 of the experiment. We also
discuss why these choices cannot be viewed as arising from other related models, both theoretically
(Section 5) and through our experimental data (Section 6).
4 Experimental Design
We conducted a computer-based experiment at the laboratory of Center for Social Sciences (C.E.S.S.)
at New York University. Subjects were recruited from the general undergraduate population via
e-mail solicitation. A total of 198 subjects participated in 12 experimental sessions where 7 of these
sessions with a total of 99 students were for the main treatment and the rest was for the extension
treatment which varied the timing of unavailability. Details of that extension treatment is provided
in Appendix II. The experiment is composed of two parts which are completed by each subject in
order. In the beginning of the experiment, the instructions for Part 1 were read aloud to ensure
clarity. Next, subjects participated in Part 1 of the experiment. After everyone in a session had
completed that part, instructions for Part 2 were read aloud. Then, subjects participated in Part 2
of the experiment and finally each participant received her payment in private. The entire process
lasted approximately 55 minutes.
Each alternative in a decision task was a bundle of consumer goods such as postcards, key
chains, folders. Before subjects started answering questions in Part 1, each consumer good that
would be the part of a bundle in the experiment was publicly shown to all subjects.8 A list of the
specific bundles used in the experiment is provided in Appendix I. Within any specific task, the
set of consumer goods used in bundles was fixed and only the amount of goods was varied across
bundles. The cost of each bundle used in the experiment was approximately the same. On average,
8Here, subjects only knew the consumer goods that would be present, but not the exact bundles that they would
face in the experiment.
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subjects earned a combination of cash and consumer goods with a combined value of $20. The
agents’ compensation was designed so that there was no strategic benefit to lying, i.e. choosing an
unpreferred bundle, and this was also explained to the subjects in the instructions.
Part 1 is composed of choice tasks. In a choice task, either (1) all displayed alternatives are
available, or (2) an unavailable alternative is also displayed in addition to the available options
presented. Subjects are asked to choose one of the available options in each task. A task in
category (1) refers to (Y, Y ) type of choice problems in ABC theory and it is called a “binary” task
if the cardinality of Y is two, a “trio” task if the cardinality of Y is three. For each trio task, there is
one corresponding task in category (2) where all three alternatives in the trio task are still presented
but one option is now displayed with an “unavailable” tag on it and is unchoosable. We call these
tasks “two+one” to indicate that two available and one unavailable alternatives are presented in the
task. These are the tasks of (S, Y ) type with S ( Y in ABC theory9 where the available alternatives
displayed in the task form the set S and all options displayed (including both the available and
unavailable ones) form the set Y . The unavailable option in a task is predetermined and is either
asymmetrically dominant, dominant, or compromise.10 To prevent any psychological effect that
might arise due to different reasons of unavailability (e.g. stock-out or sold-out), no reason for
unavailability is mentioned to subjects. For binary tasks, there are no associated questions of type
(2) since marking one alternative as unavailable would leave only one available option and hence
no room for choice.
There are 10 binary, 15 trio, and 15 two+one tasks. In each round, a choice task is presented
and subjects indicate their choices by clicking on the available bundle they like. Figures 1, 2,
and 3 show screenshots of typical rounds.11 The order of rounds and the order of alternatives in
each task are randomized for each subject. However, to guarantee that trio and two+one tasks
are not presented consecutively, randomization is done so that subjects encounter all trio tasks
before the rounds of two+one tasks start to appear. If trio tasks were allowed to appear after their
corresponding two+one tasks, then this could introduce status quo biases into the agent’s choice
problem as the alternatives she faces earlier are present later. The particular way we randomize
prevents this potential problem.
Based on ABC theory, an agent’s aspiration in a two+one task, i.e. (S, Y ), is taken to be
the alternative she chooses in the corresponding trio task, i.e. (Y, Y ). For example, a subject’s
aspiration in Figure 3 is her choice from the corresponding tasks in Figure 2. Thus, if she chooses
9From now on, for ease of notation, we will not write the property S ( Y in the text. However, whenever we
mention a pair of sets denoted with different letters, we think that the first set is a strict subset of the second.
10We say a bundle a “dominates” another bundle b if a offers weakly more of every good and strictly more of at
least one good compared to b. A bundle is “asymmetrically dominant” if it dominates exactly one of the other two
bundles and “dominant” if it dominates both of the other bundles. Finally, a bundle is a “compromise” if it is a
convex combination of the two other bundles and there are no dominance relations among the three of them. See
Figure 6 in Appendix I for more specific information. Our analysis will control for these types.
11The task in Figure 1 is of (Y, Y ) type where Y = {5 Pens and 1 Folder, 1 Pen and 5 Folders}. The task in Figure
2 is again of (Y, Y ) type but this time Y = {5 Pens and 1 Folder, 1 Pen and 5 Folders, 2 Pens and 4 Folders}. The
task in Figure 3 is of (S, Y ) type where Y = {5 Pens and 1 Folder, 1 Pen and 5 Folders, 2 Pens and 4 Folders} and
S = {5 Pens and 1 Folder, 1 Pen and 5 Folders}.
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Figure 1: A Binary Task
Figure 2: A Trio Task
Figure 3: A Two+One Task
(2 Pens, 4 Folders) in Figure 2, then her aspiration is unavailable in the corresponding task given
in Figure 3. Otherwise, if she were to choose (1 Pen and 5 Folders) or (5 Pens and 1 Folder) in
Figure 2, then her aspiration is available in the corresponding two+one task given in Figure 3. We
say “a choice reversal occurs” if a subject makes different choices from (S, Y ) and (S, S). That is,
in our terminology, a choice reversal may only occur between two choice problems with the same
set of available alternatives. In our experiment, a reversal corresponds to choosing different options
in a two+one task and its corresponding binary task that is obtained by removing the unavailable
option in the two+one task from display completely and keeping its available options only. For
example, a subject exhibits a choice reversal if she chooses different bundles from the tasks depicted
in Figures 1 and 3.12
12There are other possible violations of rationality that may occur across different choice sets. In our experiment,
a natural one is: if an alternative x is chosen in a trio task and a different alternative is made unavailable, creating
a two+one task and x is no longer chosen there. That is, choice reversals may occur only between choice problems
with exactly the same set of available alternatives, and rationality violations may occur when the set of available
alternatives is changed as well.
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Figure 4: A Typical Round in Part 2
In order to test for similarity-based behavior, we need a proxy for similarity between an aspira-
tion and other less preferred options. Recall from Section 3 that according to Guney et al. (2015),
distances can be taken as d(x, b) ≈ Ub(b)−Ub(x). In the experiment, we derive this utility difference
as a “willingness to exchange price”, i.e. how much an agent needs to be compensated to switch
from b to x when b is her aspiration. This utility difference need not be cardinally equal to the
exchange price, but rather only needs to be ordinally equivalent. Therefore, we interpret a subject’s
minimum exchange price as her “subjective distance” between the two bundles. In particular, if
an agent asks for $5 to switch from b to x, but $8 to switch from b to y, then we interpret b as
subjectively more similar or closer to x than to y.
Thus, to measure the above utility difference, we use a modification of the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak mechanism in Part 2.13 For each of the fifteen trio, i.e. (Y, Y ), tasks in Part 1, there
is a corresponding round in Part 2. Suppose that a subject has chosen bundle b in a trio task in
Part 1 and so revealed that b is her aspiration among the bundles in that task. In this case, in
the corresponding round in Part 2, this subject is provided with bundle b and asked to state the
minimum (positive) price at which she would agree to change b for each of the other two bundles in
the original trio task.14 Figure 4 shows a typical screenshot of a round in Part 2 that is displayed
13Other types of valuation measures such as willingness to pay/accept are studied in the literature, e.g. Thaler
(1980), Bateman et al (1997), Bateman et al. (2005).
14Our design guarantees the positivity of the willingness to exchange price because a subject is always provided
with her favorite (aspiration) bundle and the price she declares is for changing this favorite bundle for a less preferred
one. One may suggest that an endowment effect might be at play since the subject is provided with an alternative,
specifically her aspiration. But, an endowment effect should only increase willingness to exchange prices and thus
they should remain positive. As we focus on ordinal rankings, we only need that an aspiration leads to the same
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to a subject who has chosen (2 Pens, 4 Folders) in the trio task of Part 1 depicted in Figure 2.
If agents are rational with quasilinear utility in money, then ascertaining agent’s “subjective
distance” between a pair of bundles should be equal to the difference (in dollar terms) between
their reference-free utility levels. Therefore, when faced with an unavailable aspiration, we should
expect rational agents to choose the closest alternative with respect to the derived subjective
distance because this offers the highest available reference-free utility. However, as we know from
the literature and also from the observed data in our experiment, frequently agents do not behave
rationally and for irrational agents, the closest alternative need not be the same as the highest
reference-free utility option. Thus, we seek to understand their choices through the lens of ABC
theory.
As outlined above, Part 2 of the experiment provides a method of deriving distances as perceived
by each subject. Note that there is nothing that forces these subjective distances derived in Part 2
to be coherent with agent’s choices observed in Part 1. Moreover, the Euclidean distance naturally
serves as an objective distance measure between bundles since each bundle is an element of the
Euclidean space. Therefore, when testing for similarity-based choice behavior, it is possible to
compare the relative performance of this objective distance function with that of the subjective
distance measure derived in Part 2.
After Part 1 and 2 are both completed, each subject is paid a show-up fee of $5 and also given
an additional prize that is determined as follows:
A decision task is randomly selected for each subject. If the selected decision task is from Part
1, then the subject is given the option she has chosen in that decision task. In case a decision
task from Part 2 is selected, two objects are additionally determined randomly: (i) one bundle
from among those the subject has faced in that task and (ii) a price p∗ between 0 and 30. If the
randomly selected bundle is the one that the subject has been provided with, then she receives
that bundle. Otherwise, we use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method to determine the prize: If
the minimum price the subject has stated in the experiment is less than or equal to p∗, then she
receives the randomly selected bundle and $p∗ as a prize. Otherwise, she keeps the provided bundle
from that task as a prize.15
5 Hypotheses
Recall that in Section 3, we discussed ABC theory’s predictions along with other related theoretical
work, and in Section 4, we explained our experimental design. These two sections play an important
role in forming the current section. Here, given the experimental design, we first present our exper-
imental hypotheses based upon ABC theory’s predictions (i)-(iv) from Section 3 and then discuss
relative rankings over other non-aspiration alternatives whether or not the aspiration is endowed.
15This price p∗ can thus be understood as the market price to switch from the provided bundle to the randomly
selected bundle. Note that Part 2 tasks may depend on the subjects’ answers to Part 1, but given the above payment
method, it is in the subjects’ best interest to choose truthfully as truth-telling increases her odds of receiving her
preferred alternative in two ways, whether the Part 1 task is selected or the corresponding Part 2 task is selected.
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possible ways to distinguish among alternative explanations by other theories in the literature.
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As we know from prediction (iv), ABC theory allows for choice reversals upon the introduction
of an unavailable option into the environment only when that option serves as an aspiration. A
weaker prediction is that the amount of choice reversals is greater when the unavailable option
introduced to the environment is an aspiration compared to when it is not. Based on earlier
experimental evidence on reference effects, one can expect to see reversals upon the introduction
of a non-aspiration option (Huber et al. (1982)) and hence we form our first hypothesis based
on this weaker prediction of ABC theory. In our experimental design, Hypothesis 1 states that
choices in a two+one task and the corresponding binary task are more likely to be different when
the phantom option in the two+one task is an aspiration compared to when it is a non-aspiration.
Our second hypothesis is about the similarity channel through which aspirations can affect
choices. As we know from ABC theory’s prediction (ii), an unavailable aspiration leads one to
choose the most similar available option which might be different than the available option with
the highest utility. However, when all alternatives in a task are available, the agent maximizes
her reference-free utility and thus chooses rationally (prediction (i)). Based on these, we form our
second hypothesis which says that an available alternative is more likely to be selected when there
is a phantom aspiration in the environment that is similar to it compared to when there is no
unavailable option. In our experimental design, Hypothesis 2 can be formulated as follows: the
available alternative that is closest to the phantom aspiration in a two+one task is more likely to
be selected from that two+one task compared to when it is presented in the corresponding binary
task.
Our last hypothesis is directly derived from ABC theory’s prediction (iii) that choices are
better explained by a distance minimization procedure when a subjective distance is used rather
than an exogenously given distance function. Since alternatives in our experimental design are
bundles and thus members of the Euclidean space, a natural exogenously determined distance is
the Euclidean distance. Hence, given our set-up, we formulate our Hypothesis 3 as choices being
better explained by a distance minimization procedure when the subjective distance derived in Part
2 of the experiment is used rather than the Euclidean distance.
In order to rule out the standard theory, it suffices to observe a significant number of choice
reversals between two+one tasks and the corresponding binary tasks as different choices from the
same set of available options cannot be explained by the standard theory. In addition, Hypotheses 1
and 2 - if satisfied- also provide further evidence against rational choice. Remember that alternatives
in our experiment are deterministic and Ko¨szegi and Rabin’s (2006) model reduces to the classical
theory in such environments. Hence, any outcome that rules out standard theory in our experiment
also rules out Ko¨szegi and Rabin’s (2006) theory.
As explained before, one distinctive feature of Rubinstein and Zhou’s (1999) procedure is that
there always exists a reference point which is exogenously determined whereas ABC theory endoge-
nously derives the reference point and also allows for reference-free choice situations. Therefore, in
our experimental design, even though ABC theory can recognize the reference-free problems and
identify the relevant reference in each choice situation, Rubinstein and Zhou’s (1999) model is silent
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about reference point formation. Another distinctive feature of Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) is that
their model is exogenously based upon the standard Euclidean metric, as opposed to the subjective
distance that is used in ABC theory. In the data, we first look at the percentage of instances where
the subjectively derived distance and the Euclidean distance disagree on the closest available option
to an unavailable aspiration. If this percentage turns out to be significantly different from zero,
these two distances can be distinguished and compared. Then, our Hypothesis 3 aims at comparing
the explanatory powers of the particular subjective distance (derived according to ABC theory)
and the objective Euclidean distance (used in Rubinstein and Zhou (1999)) when agents choose an
available alternative in a two+one task where the reference point is considered to be the phantom
aspiration as modeled in ABC theory.
Note that all our hypotheses are based on the effect of an unavailable option that is an aspiration.
Given that status quo-based theories typically assume available reference points, these theories
cannot explain Hypothesis 1 or 2. Indeed, to rule out status quo-based theories, it suffices to find
significant differences even if the direction of findings are not as in the predicted directions in our
hypotheses.
As explained in Section 3, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) non-constant loss aversion model
leads to situations where an agent chooses an alternative a over b when there is no reference
point, but chooses b over a when a is the reference point. However, this is against both the
idea of aspirations and prediction (i) of ABC theory which says that an aspiration alternative is
selected when it is available. Hence, to distinguish between a non-constant loss aversion model
and ABC theory, we focus on two+one tasks and look at the frequency with which aspirations
are chosen when they are available. On the other hand, a constant loss aversion model does not
have this feature of leaving an alternative when it becomes the reference, but it forbids certain
choice patterns in our design which are permitted by the ABC theory. One such choice pattern is
illustrated in Figure 5: the simultaneous choice of d over a when b is the reference; and a over d
when c is the reference represents a violation of the constant loss aversion model while it is allowed
by ABC theory. As a numerical example, consider the following two choice problems: (S, Y )
and (S, Y ′) where S = {(1 Pen, 5 Folders), (5 Pens, 1 Folder)}; Y = S ∪ {(2 Pens, 4 Folders)};
and Y ′ = S ∪ {(4 Pens, 2 Folders)}.16 Having revealed that the bundles (2 Pens, 4 Folders) and
(4 Pens, 2 Folders) are the reference points in (S, Y ) and (S, Y ′) respectively, an agent with a
constant loss averse utility does not choose (5 Pens, 1 Folder) from (S, Y ) and (1 Pen, 5 Folders)
from (S, Y ′) simultaneously. Notice that an agent who chooses randomly can produce any choice
pattern and in particular, the probability of producing the above choice pattern is 25%. In addition
to the choice pattern above, in our experimental design there are several other choice patterns
which are permitted by ABC theory and forbidden by a constant loss aversion model. Due to the
different forms of such choice patterns, the probability of a randomly choosing agent generating
16Here, a = (1 Pen, 5 Folders), b = (2 Pens, 4 Folders), c = (4 Pens, 2 Folders), and d = (5 Pens, 1 Folder).
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Figure 5: Four consumption bundles arranged linearly
these patterns may be different for each pattern.17 Thus, in order to come up with an aggregate
measure for violations of a constant loss aversion model, we take into account expectations. In
the data, we find the the ratio of observed violations to the expected number of violations. This
aggregate measure should be 0% if agents choose as if they have constant loss averse utility and
should be 100% if agents choose randomly. ABC theory does not make a prediction for this ratio.
In the results section, we examine this ratio and test whether it is significantly different from 0%
and 100%.
Finally, in a choice experiment, one needs to be careful about agents exhibiting reversals due
to mistakes or indifferences as well as agents choosing randomly. Our last purpose in this section
is to explain how we can rule out these situations in our data.
As long as individuals’ indifference between available options or mistakes are independent of
whether an unavailable option is an aspiration or not, then there should not be a significantly differ-
ent amount of choice reversals due to aspiration and non-aspiration phantoms. Thus, observation
of a significant difference rules out mistakes or indifferences as explanations for observed behavior.
This is true regardless of whether the direction is as in Hypothesis 1 or not.
According to random choice, agents are not influenced by reference points, but rather just
choose randomly from a set of available alternatives. Therefore, an alternative must be equally
likely to be selected in different choice problems as long as the set of available options is the same.
In our design, one observation that would rule out random choice as an alternative explanation
is that the presence of unavailable aspiration alternatives in a two+one task significantly changes
the choice frequency of the available alternatives compared to the case where those alternatives are
available in a binary task. This is related to Hypothesis 2 which predicts this effect with a certain
direction although here the direction of the effect is not important for ruling out random choice.
17The other choice patterns are across two+one tasks which differ only in their phantom options. In these tasks,
phantom options either (i) asymmetrically dominate the same available alternative or (ii) dominate all available
alternatives. In either case, a constant loss averse agent should make the same selection from these two+one tasks if
she takes the phantom alternative as her reference point. When there are two suchs tasks, then the probability of a
violation of constant loss aversion by a randomly choosing agent is 50%. When there are three such tasks, then this
probability is 75%.
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6 Main Results
In all of the regression analyses conducted throughout the paper, data is clustered with respect to
subject id. In the main part of the experiment, agents face five different types of bundles classified
by the type of consumer goods available in each bundle (Section 8.2). To control for these different
bundle types in the regression analysis, a dummy variable is used for each.18 Similarly, in all the
regression analyses, we also control for the type of phantom (dominance, asymmetric dominance,
or compromise). The regression coefficients for any of these control variables are not presented in
tables as they are not the focus of this study.
We first concentrate on two+one tasks and their corresponding binary tasks to study choice
reversals due to the introduction of an unavailable option into the binary environment. The data
reveals that agents exhibit a choice reversal 16.36% of the time when the unavailable option in a
two+one task is deemed as an aspiration.19 We bootstrap the mean of choice reversals with 1000
replications and clustering on subject id (with the null hypothesis being mean= 0) and find that
the mean is significantly different than zero (p = 0.000). Alternatively, we count the percentage of
reversals for each subject and use Wilcoxon signed-rank test to find that the median of reversals is
significantly different from zero (p = 0.0000).
One might argue that the choice reversals we observe may be due to subjects’ mistakes or
indifference between the two available options. If this were the case, then we should expect that
around 50% of the time agents exhibit a choice reversal, it would be towards the subjectively closest
alternative and 50% of the time away from the subjectively closest alternative. But, the data reveals
that the subjectively derived metric has a significant prediction power. Specifically, when agents
exhibit a choice reversal, it is towards the alternative subjectively closest to the aspiration 77.12%
of the time and this is significantly different from 50% (p = 0.000, bootstrapping the difference
between the mean of reversals and 0.5). Alternatively, for each subject, we count the percentage of
reversals that is towards the subjectively closest option and Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that
the median of these percentages is significantly different from 50% (p = 0.0000). Thus, while there
may be some subjects who are (sometimes) indifferent or make mistakes, this argument cannot be
the driving force behind the observation of choice reversals.
Notice that the observed choice reversals serve as a distinction between rational behavior and
ABC theory. Reversals also rule out Ko¨szegi and Rabin’s (2006) preferred personal equilibrium
notion that replicates the rational theory in deterministic environments.
In cases where the unavailable option in two+one tasks is not an aspiration alternative, we
still observe choice reversals 8.54% of the time. This means that the unavailable alternative being
an aspiration leads to an increase in choice reversals: from 8.54% to 16.36%. While the absolute
increases may not seem that high, given the scale of choice reversals, this roughly corresponds to
18Results we obtained by regression analyses continue to hold if dummy variables for individual good type rather
than for bundle type are introduced.
19These percentages are comparable in magnitude to the amount of reversals or change in choice shares found in
other robust phenomena in the literature. For instance, Huber et al.’s (1982) percentages range between 4% and 13%
and Simonson’s (1989) were 17% on average.
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Table 1: Logistic Regression for Result 1
Dependent Variable=REV Specification
ASP 3.1529***
(0.6537)
Number of Observations 1485
Pseudo R-squared 0.1165
*** Significant at 1%
Robust standard error is in parenthesis
Number corresponding to the explanatory variable is the odds ratio
an increase of 91.56%. This increase in the odds of reversal due to a phantom being an aspiration
is found to be even stronger when other variables such as types of bundles and phantoms are
controlled for. Our next result provides such a more detailed analysis.
Result 1: The odds of a choice reversal are significantly greater when the phantom option is an
aspiration compared to the case when it is not.
We concentrate on two+one tasks and their corresponding binary tasks. Remember we say
“a choice reversal occurs” if different alternatives are chosen in these tasks. We run a logistic
regression with REV as the dependent variable, ASP as the explanatory variable, and our other
control variables. The variable REV takes 1 if there is a choice reversal and 0 otherwise; and ASP
takes 1 if the phantom option in a task is an aspiration and 0 otherwise. Table 1 reports that an
unavailable option being an aspiration (that’s, ASP=1) raises (relative to ASP=0) the overall odds
of choice reversal by 215.29% (p = 0.000).20 When we drop observations where an agent’s aspiration
is either a dominated or an asymmetrically dominated alternative, the effect of a phantom being
an aspiration becomes even stronger: it increases the odds of reversal by 307.07% (p = 0.000).21
A similar conclusion can be obtained by a non-parametric test as well. For each subject, we
count the percentages of choice reversals when ASP=0 and ASP=1. We then apply Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-rank test and reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are the same
(p = 0.0000).
To emphasize from earlier, our data rejects both the rational model and Ko¨szegi and Rabin’s
(2006) reference dependence model by the statistically significant frequency of choice reversals due
to an unavailable aspiration. In addition, Result 1 also provides further evidence against these
models. Furthermore, as long as agents’ mistakes and indifferences are independent of whether or
20When the interaction of ASP with the type of phantom is included in the analysis, we find that the variable ASP
does not inertact with the type of phantom option. Hence, the phantom option being an aspiration does not affect
choices significantly differently depending upon whether the phantom option is dominant, asymmetrically dominant,
or compromise. For details, see Appendix I.
21These dropped observations are already not included in the analysis of other results since their focus is the data
where the phantom that is either a dominant, asymmetrically dominant, or compromise option is revealed to be an
aspiration.
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Table 2: Logistic Regression for Result 2
Dependent Variable=CLOS Specification
Ph 1.3150***
(0.0940)
Number of Observations 1870
Pseudo R-squared 0.0211
*** Significant at 1%
Robust standard error is in parenthesis
Number corresponding to the explanatory variable is the odds ratio
not the unavailable alternative is an aspiration, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test applied
above accounts for such indifferences and mistakes. Hence, in addition to our earlier discussions,
we can use the result of Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test also to rule out indifferences or
mistakes as explanations for the observed choice behavior.
Our aim now is to understand whether agents choose the most similar option to their unavailable
aspiration where similarity is determined using the subjective distance function we derive in the
second part of the experiment. In our analysis, we concentrate on each two+one task and its
corresponding binary task. For each subject, we include a pair of two+one and binary tasks into
the analysis only when the phantom alternative in the two+one task is revealed to be an aspiration
for the subject. In a two+one and the corresponding binary task, one of the available options will
be closest to the unavailable aspiration and one will not. On average, the frequency of the option
closest to the unavailable aspiration being chosen in two+one tasks is 83% while the frequency of
the same option being chosen in the corresponding binary tasks is 79%. Hence, the presence of the
unavailable aspiration in the environment increases the frequency that the similar option is being
chosen.
We run a logistic regression to analyze the influence of an unavailable aspiration by comparing
the odds that this closest alternative is chosen in the two+one task with the odds that it is chosen
in the binary task. We use CLOS as the dependent variable and Ph as the independent variable.
Ph takes 1 if there is a phantom in a task (i.e. the task is two+one) and 0 otherwise (i.e. the task
is binary). CLOS takes a value of 1 if the subject chooses the option that is subjectively closest to
her unavailable aspiration and 0 otherwise.
Result 2: The presence of an unavailable aspiration significantly raises the odds that the subjec-
tively closest alternative to it is chosen relative to tasks with no unavailable aspiration.
According to Table 2, the odds that the most similar (subjectively closest) alternative is chosen
is 31.50% higher in a two+one task where the unavailable aspiration is present in the environment
compared to the case of a binary task where it is not present at all (p = 0.000).22 As an example
22This result is sensitive to the types of phantom aspiration. When the interaction of Ph with the phantom type is
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to understand this result, consider the following situation. For notational ease, let S = {b, c} and
Y = {a, b, c}. Suppose the agent chooses a from the choice problem (Y, Y ), thereby revealing a as
her most preferred element in Y . Thus, option a serves as an aspiration for the choice problem
(S, Y ). Moreover, in Part 2 of the experiment, assume her willingness to exchange prices reveal
d(a, b) < d(a, c). Then, the above result says that the odds that b is chosen from the two+one
task (S, Y ) are significantly greater than the odds that b is chosen from the binary task (S, S).
Notice that this should not be the case either in rational theory or in a random utility model. As
the feasible elements in (S, Y ) and (S, S) are exactly the same and neither model admits reference
effects, the choice frequencies from these two problems must be insignificantly different according
to both models.
Running a non-parametric test also confirms a similar result. For each subject, we count the
percentages of choosing the closest option in two+one tasks and in binary tasks. Then, we apply
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test and reject that the choice of the subjectively closest option
in two+one tasks and in binary tasks come from the same distribution (p = 0.0001).
Previous literature testing for similarity-based decision making generally relies on the use of
objective distances (e.g. Euclidean) to determine the similarity between alternatives. But, our
data shows that 35.58% of the time, the subjective and Euclidean distances disagree on the closest
option to an unavailable aspiration.23 This divergence makes it possible to compare the performance
of these two distance measures in representing agents’ choice behavior as choosing the available
alternative closest to the unavailable aspiration. Our next result addresses this.
Result 3: Choice in the presence of an unavailable aspiration is significantly better explained by a
similarity-based behavior when similarity is determined using the subjective distance rather than
the Euclidean one.
Concentrating on two+one tasks with aspiration phantoms, we find that 83.31% of choices can
be explained by the minimization of the subjective distance to the the relevant aspiration phantom
while 67.27% of choices can be explained by the minimization of the Euclidean distance. To conduct
a significance analysis, we first define two dummy variables SUB and EUC. The variable SUB takes
a value of 1 if the alternative closest to the unavailable aspiration with respect to the subjective
included, we find that the effect of Ph on CLOS is significant when the phantom is a dominant option and insignificant
when the phantom is asymmetrically dominant or compromise. For details, see Appendix I.
23We say that two distance functions disagree if according to one distance measure x is closer to z than to y
while according to the other measure x is closer to y than to z. Since the reflexivity property of any distance
function requires that an alternative is the closest option to itself, similarity-based choice behavior expects that the
aspiration alternative is chosen whenever available, regardless of the specific distance function used to determine
similarity. Therefore, to find out how frequently the Euclidean and subjective distances disagree with each other, we
concentrate on distances that are derived for only “critical” tasks: Two+one tasks where the aspiration of a subject
is the unavailable option. We generate the variable DA (disagreement) to tell us, for each subject, the percentage
of instances where the Euclidean and the subjective distance measure derived in Part 2 of the experiment disagree
on the distance ordering of two bundles from a fixed unavailable aspiration bundle. DA has a mean 0.3558 and a
standard deviation 0.1881, with a min 0 and max 1. Bootstrapping its mean with 1000 replications and clustering
around subject id reveals that it is significantly different from zero (p = 0.000). Alternatively, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test also shows that the median of DA is significantly different from zero (p = 0.0000).
21
distance is chosen from a task and 0 otherwise. Similarly, if a subject chooses the closest option
with respect to the Euclidean distance, then the variable EUC takes 1 and otherwise it takes 0.
The mean of SUB is 0.8331 while the mean of EUC is 0.6727. To test whether the difference
between means of SUB and EUC is significant, we restrict attention to observations where SUB
and EUC take different values. This gives us that the mean 0.721 for SUB (and 0.279 for EUC).
Bootstrapping the difference between the mean of SUB and 0.5 with a replication of 1000 times
and clustering around subject id, we find that the mean of SUB is significantly greater than 0.5
(p = 0.000). This implies that choices observed in the first part of the experiment are significantly
better explained via similarity-based decision making when similarity is determined according to
the subjective distances derived in Part 2 rather than the Euclidean distance.24
Alternatively, without excluding any observations, a similar analysis now follows. Since each of
SUB and EUC variables is observed for each subject more than once, we summarize each of these
variables by a percentage for each subject. As a result, for each subject there is now a unique SUB
and a unique EUC value between 0 and 1, telling us the percentage of her choices that are closest to
her unavailable aspirations according to the subjective and Euclidean distances, respectively. We
then use Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank and reject the hypothesis that SUB and EUC come
from the same distribution (p = 0.0000).
One might think that going for the next best option is not surprising since the subjective
distance is simply derived through prices in our experiment. As already explained in Section 4,
for rational agents, choosing the closest alternative with respect to the derived subjective distance
is also consistent with the classical theory because this closest option offers the highest available
reference-free utility. However, for irrational agents, the closest alternative need not be the same
as the highest reference-free utility option. Hence, when an agent’s behavior cannot be explained
by the classical theory, she is not naturally expected to choose the closest option with respect to
her subjective distance.
Our data reveals the following on this matter. When we concentrate on seemingly rational
choices from two+one tasks, i.e. choices that are not reversed in the corresponding binary tasks,
15.47% of these cannot be explained by the minimization of the subjectively derived distance. This
is in contrast to what is expected by the classical theory. Moreover, we see a significant amount
of irrationality in our data and when we concentrate on choices from two+one tasks which are
reversed in the corresponding binary tasks and hence do not abide by rationality, the amount that
cannot be explained by the minimization of the subjectively derived distance increases to 22.87%.
If explaining choices through the endogenously derived distance were to be a trivial issue, then the
amount of choices that cannot be explained by the subjective distance should not be significant in
any case. Furthermore, the amount of choices that can (or cannot) be explained by the minimum
subjective distance also would not significantly change depending on whether or not choices exhibit
reversals because one would expect the distance to explain choices all the time. However, as seen
from the data above, this is not the case. Both frequencies are significantly different from zero and
24The type of the phantom does not have an impact on this result. For details, see Appendix I.
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the change from 15.47% to 22.87% is also significant. Therefore, the explanation of choices through
the minimization of the endogenously derived distance cannot be a trivial issue. Note that even
though there are still choices that cannot be explained by the minimum subjective distance to an
unavailable aspiration, Results 2 and 3 show that an unavailable aspiration plays a significant role
in leading people to go for the option that is subjectively most similar to it.
As explained before, Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) consider choice problems with exogenous
reference points and therefore is silent about what the reference point in a choice task is in our
experimental set-up. If we assume that the aspirations derived in our experiment serve as reference
points in Rubinstein and Zhou’s (1999) work, then their theory predicts that agents choose the
alternative that minimizes the Euclidean distance to those aspirations. According to our Result
3, observed choices are better explained by the minimization of the particular subjective distance
derived in Part 2 of the experiment than by the Euclidean distance.
As discussed in Section 5, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) non-constant loss aversion theory
over a large enough domain must lead to a situation where an agent chooses an alternative a over
b when there is no reference point, but chooses b over a when a is the reference point. This is
against our findings in the experiment where the aspiration alternative is generally selected when
it is available (90.49% of the time).25 Regarding Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) constant loss
aversion model, there are specific choice tasks in our design which cannot be accommodated by
a constant loss aversion model but are permitted by the ABC theory. As explained in detail in
Section 5, when aggregating violations of a constant loss aversion model across several choice tasks,
we take into account expectations and find the overall ratio of observed violations to the expected
number of violations if an agent chooses randomly. This ratio should be 0% if agents follow a
constant loss aversion model and should be 100% if agents choose randomly. In our data, this
ratio is 16.89% and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that it is significantly different from both 0
(p = 0.0000) and 100 (p = 0.0000).26
Finally, our results cannot be explained by status quo-based theories either. Typically, such
theories assume that the status quo is available for choice (Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014))
whereas in our experiment it is unavailable alternatives that influence choice. Furthermore, in our
experiment, aspirations are alternatives which have been revealed to be superior to all available
alternatives. This provides another reason why choice with aspirations cannot be understood
through standard status quo models as in such models the status quo alternative rules out all
inferior alternatives.
25This percentage refers to the overall frequency of the aspiration alternative being chosen in the relevant two+one
task where a non-aspiration alternative is made unavailable. This also corresponds to testing one of the axioms used
to characterize ABC theory: For any three nested sets T ⊆ S ⊆ Y , if C(S, Y ) ∩ T 6= ∅, then C(T, Y ) = C(S, Y ) ∩ T .
To test this axiom using our design, we take T = {x, y} and S = Y = {x, y, z} where C(Y, Y ) = {x}. We find that
in such situations C(T, Y ) = {x}, 90.49% of the time.
26Additionally, the probability of an agent producing a violation when choosing randomly with non-uniform prob-
abilities is lower. Thus, the ratio of 16.89% represents a lower bound.
23
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of unavailable aspirations on choice using an experimental design
that is incentive compatible. It introduces a new experimental methodology to deduce the relevant
endogenously formed aspiration in each choice situation and its distance from other options as
perceived by each individual. This novelty gives us the opportunity (1) to distinguish between the
effects of a phantom option when it is an aspiration and when it is not, (2) to understand how the
presence of an unavailable aspiration affects the choice of the subjectively closest alternative relative
to cases where the unavailable aspiration is not present, and (3) to compare the performance of
the Euclidean distance with that of a subjective distance when testing for similarity-based decision
making.
Even though the mere presence of a phantom alternative in the environment can lead a decision
maker to exhibit a choice reversal, the odds of reversal are found to increase significantly when the
phantom is has the additional power of being an aspiration. This result is important because it
shows that the effect of aspirations are stronger than that of non-aspiration alternatives (Punch-
line: “Among unavailable alternatives, aspirations affect choice more”). We also find support for
similarity-based decision making. The choice of an available option is observed to be more likely
when there is a similar and unavailable aspiration in the environment compared to when there is no
such option in the environment. This result conveys a channel, namely that of similarity, through
which aspirations can affect choices (Punchline: “Unavailable aspirations affect choice by similar-
ity”). Moreover, the subjective distance measure is found to perform better than the objective
Euclidean distance in explaining similarity-based behavior, providing a distinction between ABC
Theory and Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) (Punchline: “Subjective distances better explain choices
than the Euclidean distance”). As opposed to the disagreeing evidence in the literature on how
the timing when unavailability is revealed affects the choice of similar alternatives, our extension
treatment which is explained in Appendix II shows that this timing impact disappears when aspi-
rations are deduced endogenously from choices and a subjective distance measure is used for each
decision maker to reflect similarities between her aspirations and other options.
This paper finds unavailable aspirations may affect choices and provides a method to deduce
both aspirations and subjective distances. These have the potential to be useful for both marketers
and policy makers. For instance, a firm may profitably introduce highly desired and unavailable
alternatives (due to prices, limited supply, age restrictions, etc.) to sway consumers and a govern-
ment may also wish to do so to sway behavior as in the Presidential Fitness Challenge for school-age
students.27 Studying such paternalistic policies and measuring their impact through field studies is
an interesting area to explore. Another promising avenue of research may be to extend the model
to a dynamic setting to experimentally study the evolution of aspirations and the impact of this
dynamic process.
27See https://www.presidentschallenge.org/challenge/physical/benchmarks.shtml. This challenge sets a desirable
fitness level across different tasks which is unavailable for most students, but which may serve to sway students to
acheive higher fitness levels.
24
References
[1] Bateman, I., Kahneman, D., Munro, A., Starmer, C., and Sugden, R. Testing Com-
peting Models of Loss Aversion: An Adversarial Collaboration. Journal of Public Economics
89 (2005), 1561–1580.
[2] Bateman, I., Munro, A., Rhodes, B., Starmer, C., and Sugden, R. A Test of the
Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997),
479–505.
[3] Becker, G., Degroot, M., and Marschak, J. Measuring Utility by a Single-Response
Sequential Method. Behavioral Science 9 (1964), 226–236.
[4] Bendor, J., Mookherjee, D., and Ray, D. Aspirations, Adaptive Learning, and Cooper-
ation in Repeated Games. Discussion Paper, Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New
Delhi (1995).
[5] Bendor, J., Mookherjee, D., and Ray, D. Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interac-
tion Games. Advances in Economic Theory 1 (2001), Article 3.
[6] Cho, I.-K., and Matsui, A. Learning Aspiration in Repeated Games. Journal of Economic
Theory 124 (2005), 171–201.
[7] Doyle, J., O’Connor, D., Reynolds, G., and Bottomley, P. The Robustness of
the Asymmetrically Dominated Effect: Buying Frames, Phantom Alternatives, and In-Store
Purchases. Psychology and Marketing 16 (1999), 225–242.
[8] Farquhar, P. H., and Pratkanis, A. R. A Brief History of Research on Phantom Alter-
natives: Evidence for Seven Empirical Generalizations About Phantoms. Basic and Applied
Social Psychology 13 (December 1992), 103–122.
[9] Farquhar, P. H., and Pratkanis, A. R. Decision Structuring with Phantom Alternatives.
Management Science 39 (1993), 1214–1226.
[10] Genicot, G., and Ray, D. Aspirations and Inequality. Working Paper (2014).
[11] Guney, B., Richter, M., and Tsur, M. Aspiration Based Choice Theory. Working Paper
(2015).
[12] Harnett, D. L. A Level of Aspiration Model for Group Decision Making. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 5 (1967), 58–66.
[13] Hedgcock, W., Rao, A. R., and Chen, H. A. Could Ralph Nader’s Entrance and Exit
Have Helped Al Gore? The Impact of Decoy Dynamics on Consumer Choice. Journal of
Marketing Research 46 (2009), 330–343.
25
[14] Highhouse, S. Context-Dependent Selection: The Effects of Decoy and Phantom Job Can-
didates. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 65 (1996), 68–76.
[15] Huber, J., Payne, J. W., and Puto, C. Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives:
Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis. Journal of Consumer Research: An
Interdisciplinary Quarterly 9 (1982), 90–98.
[16] Karandikar, R., Mookherjee, D., Ray, D., and Vega-Redondo, F. Evolving Aspira-
tions and Cooperation. Journal of Economic Theory 80 (1998), 292–331.
[17] Ko¨szegi, B., and Rabin, M. A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 121 (2006), 1133–1165.
[18] Masatlioglu, Y., and Ok, E. Rational Choice with Status Quo Bias. Journal of Economic
Theory 121 (2005), 1–29.
[19] Masatlioglu, Y., and Ok, E. A Canonical Model of Choice with Initial Endowments. The
Review of Economic Studies 81 (2014), 851–883.
[20] Min, K. S. Consumer Response to Product Unavailability. PhD Thesis, the Ohio State
University (2003).
[21] Payne, J., Laughhunn, D., and Crum, R. Translation of Gambles and Aspiration Level
Effects in Risky Choice Behavior. Management Science 26 (1980), 1039–1060.
[22] Payne, J., Laughhunn, D., and Crum, R. Further Tests of Aspiration Level Effects in
Risky Choice Behavior. Management Science 27 (1981), 953–958.
[23] Pettibone, J. C., and Wedell, D. H. Examining Models of Nondominated Decoy Effects
Across Judgment and Choice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 81
(2000), 300–328.
[24] Rubinstein, A., and Zhou, L. Choice Problems with a ’Reference’ Point. Mathematical
Social Sciences 37 (1999), 205–209.
[25] Simon, H. A. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics 69
(1955), 99–118.
[26] Simonson, I. Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise Effects.
Journal of Consumer Research 16 (1989), 158–174.
[27] Thaler, R. Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 1 (1980), 39–60.
[28] Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent
Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1991), 1039–1061.
26
8 Appendix I: Additional Analysis for the Main Experiment
8.1 The Types of Phantom Bundles
Consider two bundles x and y such that each is composed of quantities of good 1 and good 2 where
x has more of good 2 and y has more of good 1. According to the figure below, an alternative
in the blue region asymmetrically dominates x, an alternative in the green region asymmetrically
dominates y, an alternative in the gray region dominates both x and y, and finally an alternative
on the red line is a compromise (intermediate) option.
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Figure 6: Dominant, Asymmetrically Dominant, and Compromise Options
In the main experiment, there were 15 tasks with a phantom option. The phantom bundle was
asymmetrically dominant in 5 tasks, dominant in 6 tasks, and compromise in 4 tasks.
In Section 6, the effect of phantom types on our results is provided in several footnotes. The
aim here is to give details on these effects. For the following analysis, defining two variables is
useful: the variable AD takes 1 if the phantom option is asymmetrically dominant and 0 otherwise
whereas the variable COMP takes 1 if the phantom option is compromise and 0 otherwise. Note
that since the variables AD and COMP together define uniquely whether a phantom is dominant
or not, we don’t include a dummy variable for dominant phantoms which will serve as a baseline
while interpreting the regression results. In all the regression analyses conducted throughout the
paper, the variables AD and COMP are already included to control for their main effects. The
current appendix further includes their interactions with other variables to understand whether our
results differ depending upon the type of a phantom.
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Table A.1: Updated Result 1: Including the Interactions with the Types of Phantoms
Dependent Variable=REV Specification
ASP 5.1599**
(3.8381)
ASP*AD 0.8118
(0.6480)
ASP*COMP 0.3104
(0.2540)
Number of Observations 1485
Pseudo R-squared 0.1215
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Robust standard error is in parenthesis
Number corresponding to the explanatory variable is the odds ratio
According to Result 1 in Section 6, the odds of a choice reversal are significantly greater when
the phantom option is an aspiration compared to when it is not. In order to see whether the effect
of phantom being an aspiration differs depending upon the type of phantom, we include into the
regression analysis (shown in Table 1) the interaction variables ASP*AD and ASP*COMP where
the variable ASP is as defined there and the variables AD and COMP are as defined in the previous
paragraph. The result of the new regression analysis is shown in the Table A.1 where all coefficients
corresponding to independent variables are odds ratios. We find that ASP does not interact with
AD and COMP (p = 0.794 and p = 0.153, respectively). Therefore, a phantom being an aspiration
affects choice reversals in the same way regardless of whether the phantom option is dominant,
asymmetrically dominant, or compromise.
Result 2 of the main analysis says that an available alternative is more likely to be chosen from
a two+one task where the phantom aspiration is closest to it compared to when it is presented in
the corresponding binary task. This result is affected by phantom type. Adding the interaction
variables Ph*AD and Ph*COMP into the original regression in Section 6 gives that Ph interacts
both with AD and COMP (p = 0.027 and p = 0.000, respectively). See Table A.2. When the
phantom aspiration is a dominant alternative, its presence increases the odds of choosing the
closest option by 61.67% (p = 0.000) but the effect of a phantom aspiration on the choice of closest
option is insignificant when it is asymmetrically dominant or compromise (p = 0.243 and 0.188,
respectively).28
Finally, according to Result 3, observed choices are better explained by a distance minimiza-
tion procedure when the subjective distance derived in the second part of the experiment is used
compared to when the Euclidean distance is used. The phantom type has no effect on this finding.
To see this, we run a logistic regression where the variable SUB is the dependent variable and the
28Note that since the baseline is the dominant type, Ph in Table A.2 shows the effect of the presence of a phantom
aspiration when it is a dominant alternative.
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Table A.2: Updated Result 2: Including the Interactions with the Types of Phantoms
Dependent Variable=CLOS Specification
Ph 1.6167***
(0.1792)
Ph*AD 0.6967**
(0.1140)
Ph*COMP 0.5003***
(0.0981)
Number of Observations 1870
Pseudo R-squared 0.0238
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Robust standard error is in parenthesis
Number corresponding to the explanatory variable is the odds ratio
variables AD and COMP are the independent variables. SUB takes 1 if a choice in a two+one
task is explained better by the subjective distance and 0 if it is better explained by the Euclidean
distance.29 AD and COMP are defined as before. This reveals that p-values for AD and COMP
are 0.125 and 0.531, respectively (Table A.3) and hence, the type of phantom does not matter for
the superior performance of the subjective distance over the Euclidean distance.
Table A.3: Updated Result 3: Regression Analysis Including the Types of Phantoms
Dependent Variable=SUB Specification
AD 0.6543
(0.1808)
COMP 1.2159
(0.3795)
Number of Observations 338
Pseudo R-squared 0.0070
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Robust standard error is in parenthesis
Number corresponding to the explanatory variable is the odds ratio
29We concentrate on choices that can be explained by exactly one of the subjective and Euclidean distances.
29
8.2 Details about the Design of the Main Experiment
Bundles in the Main Experiment
Here, we present the set of bundles subjects faced in each task in the main experiment. A
bundle with an “X” sign next to it means that it was presented as a phantom option in that task
in Part 1.
Compromise Tasks:
• (1 Pen, 5 Folders); (2 Pens, 4 Folders); (5 Pens, 1 Folder)
• (1 Pen, 5 Folders); (2 Pens, 4 Folders) X ; (5 Pens, 1 Folder)
• (1 Pen, 5 Folders); (4 Pens, 2 Folders); (5 Pens, 1 Folder)
• (1 Pen, 5 Folders); (4 Pens, 2 Folders) X ; (5 Pens, 1 Folder)
• (1 Pen, 5 Folders); (5 Pens, 1 Folder)
• (2 Postcards, 10 Stamps); (4 Postcards, 8 Stamps); (10 Postcards, 2 Stamps)
• (2 Postcards, 10 Stamps); (4 Postcards, 8 Stamps) X ; (10 Postcards, 2 Stamps)
• (2 Postcards, 10 Stamps); (8 Postcards, 4 Stamps); (10 Postcards, 2 Stamps)
• (2 Postcards, 10 Stamps); (8 Postcards, 4 Stamps) X ; (10 Postcards, 2 Stamps)
• (2 Postcards, 10 Stamps); (10 Postcards, 2 Stamps)
Asymmetric Dominance Tasks:
• (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder); (4 Key Chains, 1 Folder)
• (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder); (4 Key Chains, 1 Folder) X
• (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder); (6 Key Chains, 1 Folder)
• (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder); (6 Key Chains, 1 Folder) X
• (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder); (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (1 Key Chain, 4 Folders)
• (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder); (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (1 Key Chain, 4 Folders) X
• (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder); (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (1 Key Chain, 6 Folders)
• (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder); (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (1 Key Chain, 6 Folders) X
• (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder)
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• (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (4 Key Chains, 1 Folder)
• (1 Key Chain, 3 Folders); (6 Key Chains, 1 Folder)
• (1 Key Chain, 4 Folders); (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder)
• (1 Key Chain, 6 Folders); (3 Key Chains, 1 Folder)
• (1 Pack of Gum, 5 Pens); (9 Packs of Gum, 5 Pens); (10 Packs of Gum, 1 Pen)
• (1 Pack of Gum, 5 Pens); (9 Packs of Gum, 5 Pens) X ; (10 Packs of Gum, 1 Pen)
• (1 Pack of Gum, 5 Pens); (10 Packs of Gum, 1 Pen)
Dominance Tasks:
• (1 Bar of Chocolate, 2 Stickers); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 1 Sticker); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 4
stickers)
• (1 Bar of Chocolate, 2 Stickers); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 1 Sticker); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 4
stickers) X
• (1 Bar of Chocolate, 2 Stickers); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 1 Sticker); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 2
stickers)
• (1 Bar of Chocolate, 2 Stickers); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 1 Sticker); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 2
stickers) X
• (1 Bar of Chocolate, 2 Stickers); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 1 Sticker); (4 Bars of Chocolate, 2
stickers)
• (1 Bar of Chocolate, 2 Stickers); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 1 Sticker); (4 Bars of Chocolate, 2
stickers) X
• (1 Bar of Chocolate, 2 Stickers); (2 Bars of Chocolate, 1 Sticker)
• (2 Pens, 2 Packs of Gum); (1 Pen, 4 Packs of Gum); (4 Pens, 4 Packs of Gum)
• (2 Pens, 2 Packs of Gum); (1 Pen, 4 Packs of Gum); (4 Pens, 4 Packs of Gum) X
• (2 Pens, 2 Packs of Gum); (1 Pen, 4 Packs of Gum); (3 Pens, 6 Packs of Gum)
• (2 Pens, 2 Packs of Gum); (1 Pen, 4 Packs of Gum); (3 Pens, 6 Packs of Gum) X
• (2 Pens, 2 Packs of Gum); (1 Pen, 4 Packs of Gum); (2 Pens, 8 Packs of Gum)
• (2 Pens, 2 Packs of Gum); (1 Pen, 4 Packs of Gum); (2 Pens, 8 Packs of Gum) X
• (2 Pens, 2 Packs of Gum); (1 Pen, 4 Packs of Gum)
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Instructions for the Main Treatment
(Treatment “Earlier”)
This is an experiment in decision making. Thank you for agreeing to participate. Please make
sure your mobile phones are turned off to avoid interruptions during the experiment.
Your participation in this experiment is voluntary but we hope that you will also find the
experiment interesting. You will be compensated for your participation; you will earn a combination
of cash and consumer goods. Your final payoff will include a show-up fee of $5 and the rest will
partly depend on the choices you have made and partly on chance.
The experiment will be conducted on the computer screen in front of you. Please do not talk
or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment.
Please follow the instructions carefully. If you have any questions while the experiment is
described, please raise your hand and your question will be answered so everyone can hear. The
problems are not designed to test you. We are only interested in your personal opinion.
The experiment consists of two parts: Part I and Part II. Each part is composed of a series of
decision tasks. At the end of the experiment, one of the decision tasks will be selected randomly
and payment will be made accordingly. Each decision task is equally likely to be selected. Since
you do not know which question will be picked, you need to answer all questions in both parts.
The published results of our research will not identify any individual or the choice he or she
made in any way. All records will be linked to an anonymous subject ID only.
At the end of the experiment, we will call you, one at a time, to pay you in private.
We will now discuss the instructions and payment method for tasks from Part I, and then you
will participate in the first part of the experiment. After everyone has completed the first part
of the experiment, we will then discuss the instructions and payment method for Part II of the
experiment which you will then take.
PART I: In each decision task, you will be presented with several bundles of consumer goods
and asked to choose your most preferred bundle among the available bundles presented. To select
a bundle, click on the bundle you prefer and then click submit. Once you submit, you cannot go
back and change your choice in that decision task.
There are no right or wrong answers. We are only interested in the choices you would make
in each given situation. The only right answer is what you would really choose. It is in your best
interest to answer each question truthfully.
Payment Method:
If the decision task randomly selected at the end of the experiment is from part I, then- in
addition to your show-up fee of $5- you will be given the option you chose in that particular
decision task.
IT BENEFITS YOU TO CHOOSE YOUR MOST PREFERRED OPTION IN EACH DECI-
SION TASK because you don’t know which decision task will be randomly picked at the end of the
experiment. Recall that any decision task is equally likely to be selected.
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Are there any questions?
If there are no questions, please press Continue button and proceed to the first part of the
experiment.
When you finish, please wait for our announcement to start Part 2, which will be started after
everyone has completed the first part of the experiment.
PART II: Each decision task will consist of a set of bundles and you will be provided with one of
them. For every other bundle in that task, you will be asked to state the minimum compensation
in dollars that you would be willing to accept to change from the provided bundle to that bundle.
Here is an example:
Previously, when asked to choose between bundle A and the bundles listed below, you chose
bundle A. Now, suppose that you are given bundle A. Next to each of the bundles listed below,
please enter the minimum compensation (in dollars) you are willing to accept to switch from A to
that bundle, and then click on the Submit button at the end of the page.
B —-
C —-
Notice that, since you will always be provided with your most preferred bundles, the minimum
compensations you will enter should be greater than 0. Minimum compensations can be expressed
in decimals. For example, 7.45 represents $7 and 45 cents. If your minimum compensation is a
whole number, then you do not need to specify the number of cents, you may simply enter that
whole dollar amount.
Again in this part, there are no right or wrong answers. We are only interested in your personal
opinion.
PAYMENT METHOD:
If the decision task randomly selected at the end of the experiment is from Part II, then- in
addition to your $5 show-up fee- you will be paid according to the following rule:
One of the bundles in that randomly selected decision task will be chosen.
If the selected bundle in the task is the one you are provided with, then you will get that bundle.
Otherwise: A market price p* will be chosen randomly between $0.01 and $30. If p* is larger than
or equal to the minimum amount you have stated, then you will leave the option you were provided
with, get the other option instead and also be paid p*. Otherwise, you will keep the option you
own.
Example:
Suppose that the minimum amount that you are willing to accept to switch from bundle A to
bundle B is $3. Then, it is in your best interest to state 3 as your minimum switching price because
of the following reason:
Suppose that you entered the price $6 instead. In this case, if $5 is drawn as the random
switching price at the end of the experiment, you will receive bundle A because the price drawn
was less than the price you specified. However, in truth you were willing to switch for $3, and
hence would have preferred to switch from A to B and received $5. On the other hand, suppose
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that you entered the price $1 instead of your true price of $3. In this case, imagine that $2 is drawn
as the random switching price at the end of the experiment. In this event, you will receive bundle
B and $2, a combination that is worse to you than receiving bundle A because your true minimum
switching price was $3.
Therefore, it is not in your interest to lie upwards or downwards, but rather IT BENEFITS
YOU TO STATE YOUR TRUE MINIMUM COMPENSATION IN EVERY TASK.
Are there any questions? If not, please press Continue button and proceed to Part 2.
When you finish, please raise your hand so that the experimenter can make your payment.
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9 Appendix II: Extensions
9.1 Description and Results
Here, we extend our design in two different directions. In the first extension, we conduct a treatment
where we vary the timing of unavailability. In the second one, we extend the setting of choice
problems to analyze how the greater number of (un)available options in a task or attributes in a
bundle affect our findings.
9.1.1 The Timing of Unavailability
The experimental literature finds disagreeing evidence regarding the effect of a highly desirable
phantom option, depending upon when its unavailability is revealed. Hedgcock et al. (2009) show
that a highly desirable phantom is more likely to induce a decision maker to choose a similar alter-
native if unavailability is revealed later rather than earlier whereas Min (2003) finds the opposite.
To analyze how the timing of revelation of unavailability affects our findings, we introduce a new
treatment and compare its results with our benchmark findings.
We call our benchmark in Section 4 Treatment Earlier (E). There, a subject learns about
unavailability as soon as she faces a round. Hence, unavailability - if there is any - is revealed early
within a round, namely at the outset of a round. We introduce a timing variation by changing how
trio and two+one tasks are presented. In the new treatment, called Later (L), trio and two+one
tasks are tied together, each being a stage of the same round: in the first stage, a subject is
asked to make a choice from a trio task and in the second stage, she is asked to choose from the
corresponding two+one task where one pre-determined alternative in the trio task is now labeled
as unavailable. Here, unavailability is revealed later within a round, namely in the second stage
of that round. Figures 7 and 8 show a typical 2-stage round in this treatment. In Treatment L,
binary tasks are still presented as single-stage tasks as in the benchmark treatment.
Every round in Treatment E corresponds to a (round, stage)-pair in Treatment L. For example,
Figures 7 and 8 in Treatment L correspond to Figures 2 and 3 in Treatment E, respectively.
Therefore, the specific bundles used in Treatment L is the same as the bundles used in Treatment
E. There are 10 binary (one-stage) rounds and 15 two-stage rounds in Treatment L; the order of
bundles in a task and the order of rounds are also randomized.
To better understand the timing setting, consider the following example. A customer visits a
cinema and waits on line to purchase a movie ticket. At one chain of cinemas, the list of current
movies is displayed with sold out movies marked as unavailable. This is an example of the one-stage
rounds that an agent faces in the Treatment E. On the other hand, at a different chain of cinemas,
the list of current movies does not have the “sold-out” feature. Rather, when the agent reaches the
ticket booth and talks to the seller, the seller may inform her that some movies are sold out. This
is an example of a two-stage round faced in the Treatment L.
In Treatment L, all findings but one are the same as in our benchmark results. Specifically, a lo-
gistic regression analysis reveals that the introduction of an unavailable option into the environment
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Figure 7: First Stage of a Two-Stage Round in Treatment L (Trio Task)
Figure 8: Second Stage that follows Figure 7 (Two+One Task)
leads to choice reversals in Treatment L that are not statistically different than those in Treatment
E, regardless of whether the phantom option is aspiration (p = 0.108) or not (p = 0.637).30 Con-
sequently, the increase in the odds of reversal due to phantom option being an aspiration (relative
to the case it is not) is not statistically different in both treatments (p = 0.181).31 As for the
similarity-based decision making in Treatment L, choices in the presence of an unavailable aspira-
tion are also better explained by a distance minimization procedure when the subjective distance
is used rather than the Euclidean one and moreover, a logistic regression analysis reveals that the
magnitude of the subjective distance’s superior performance over the Euclidean is not statistically
different in both treatments (p = 0.751).32
The only result that does not survive in Treatment L is the counterpart of Result 2 in the
benchmark analysis. Unlike Treatment E’s Result 2, in Treatment L the odds of choosing the
closest option are not statistically different in two+one tasks and their corresponding binary tasks
30We pool the data for both treatments and run one logistic regression on the data where the unavailable option
is known to be an aspiration and one on the data where the phantom option is not an aspiration. The regression has
REV (defined as before) as the dependent variable; treatL as the explanatory variable which takes 1 if the treatment
is L and 0 otherwise; and our control variables (types of bundles and phantoms). p−values reported in the text
indicate that the treatment has no significant effect on reversals.
31The reported p-value corresponds to the interaction between the explanatory variables ASP and treatL (defined
as before) in the logistic regression with REV as the dependent variable; ASP and treatL as the explanatory variables;
and our control variables. All these variables are defined as before. In the pooled data, the odds of choice reversal
are now found to be 180% (p = 0.000) greater when the unavailable option is an aspiration compared to the case
when it is not, regardless of the treatment.
32Dropping the observations for which both SUB and EUC (defined as before) take the same value and pooling
the observations in both treatments, we run a logistic regression with SUB as the dependent variable; treatL as the
explanatory variable; and other control variables. p-value reported in the text indicates that treatment’s effect is not
significant.
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(p = 0.923).33 The joint analysis of both treatments via a logistic regression reveals the following
interesting finding as well. In two+one tasks, the timing of when unavailability is revealed has
no significant effect on the odds of choosing the alternative that is subjectively closest to the
unavailable aspiration (p = 0.953).34 As opposed to marketing and psychology literatures that find
disagreeing evidence regarding whether an earlier or a later declaration of unavailability increases
the odds that the most similar (with respect to an objective distance function) option is chosen, our
result shows that the timing effect vanishes when we derive subjective aspirations and distances.
9.1.2 Form of Choice Tasks
We now briefly discuss how the results change if there is an increase in either: (1) the number
of available options in a task, (2) the number of phantom options in a task, or (3) the number
of attributes used to define each alternative. All of the tasks in this extension were embedded in
Treatments E and L. Hence, no separate treatment was conducted for the extensions regarding the
form of choice tasks. We study each of the three factors one at a time. We call a task “quad” if four
bundles are displayed and they are all available. We call a task “x+y” if the task has x number
of available bundles and y number of unavailable bundles. The unavailable option in a three+one
task or one of the unavailable options in a two+two task is an aspiration there if it is chosen from
the corresponding quad task where all four alternatives are available. As in the main analysis, in
all the regression analyses, we use clustering with respect to subject id and also control for types
of bundles and phantom alternatives.
To analyze the case of a greater number of available options in a task, we concentrate on
trio, quad, and three+one tasks. Reversals in these tasks are defined analogously to those in
the main section. Here, we say “a choice reversal occurs” if different alternatives are chosen in
a three+one task and the corresponding trio task which is obtained by removing the unavailable
option in the three+one task from display. Similar to our main results, in this particular extension,
we find significant choice reversals both when the phantom is an aspiration (20.3%, p = 0.000,
bootstrapping) and when it is not (12.7%, p = 0.022, bootstrapping).35 Moreover, the increase in
choice reversals due to the phantom option being an aspiration is significant (p = 0.000) and the
magnitude of this increase is robust to variation in the number of available alternatives in a task, i.e.
33We apply the same regression in Result 2 to the data obtained for Treatment L and the reported p-value indicates
that the effect of the variable Ph is not significant.
34We pool the data and run a logistic regression with CLOS as the dependent variable; Ph and treatL as the ex-
planatory variables; and our control variables. The above reported p-value indicates that treatment has no significant
effect on choosing the closest option in tasks with phantom options, i.e. when Ph=1.
35A logistic regression analysis shows that the effect of timing treatment on reversal is insignificant both when the
phantom is aspration (p = 0.411) and when it is not (p = 0.956). Therefore, we calculate the percentage of reversals
using the data for both Treatments L and E. In the text, we report p−values obtained by bootstrapping analyses,
but note that Wilcoxon signed-rank test also gives similar results.
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benchmark vs. extension tasks (p = 0.388).36 As for the test of similarity-based37 decision making,
we concentrate on phantoms that are aspirations and using a regression analysis, we find that in
this particular extension, the presence of a phantom in the environment increases the odds that
the alternative subjectively closest to it is chosen (p = 0.060), regardless of the timing treatment.38
Finally, independent of the timing treatment, a greater number of available alternatives significantly
raises the odds that the option which is Euclidean-wise closest to the unavailable aspiration is chosen
(p = 0.025).39 Bootstrapping analyses show that, unlike the benchmark case, there is no longer
a significant difference between performances of the subjective and euclidean distances in either
treatment when we concentrate on three+one tasks (p = 0.724 in Treatment E and p = 0.162 in
Treatment Later).
Next, we analyze how the presence of two phantoms (where one is an aspiration and the other
is not) affects choices. Even though a significant number (6.25%, p = 0.001, bootstrapping) of
choices between the two available options still reverse when these options are presented in a binary
versus two+two task, the odds of reversal decrease significantly with the addition of the second
phantom in the environment (p = 0.000), regardless of the timing when unavailability is revealed.40
36To see this, we pool the relevant data and run a logistic regression with dependent variable REV; independent
variables ASP, treatL, AvailAlt as well as their interactions; and our other control variables. Consider two+one
tasks and the corresponding binary tasks which are obtained by removing the unavailable option in two+one task
from display. From three+one tasks, similarly obtain the corresponding trio tasks. Variable REV takes 1 whenever
a subject chooses different alternatives in a two+one and the corresponding binary task or in a three+one and
the corresponding trio task. REV takes 0 otherwise. AvailAlt takes 1 if choices from trio and three+one tasks
are compared, 0 if the comparison is made for binary and two+one tasks. ASP takes 1 if the unavailable option in
three+one or two+one task is an aspiration and 0 otherwise. This analysis finds no significant 2- or 3-way interactions
between treatL, AvailAlt, and ASP. We find that an unavailable option being an aspiration significantly raises the
odds of reversal (p = 0.000), regardless of the timing treatment and the number of available alternatives in the task.
Furthermore, the odds of reversal when AvailAlt=1 and when AvailAlt=0 are not significantly different (p = 0.893),
independent of the timing treatment and whether an unavailable option is an aspiration or not.
37We measure the similarity between alternatives in this extension in the same way as before, more specifically via
applying our “willingness to exchange price” method to quad tasks.
38We concentrate on trio and three+one tasks in this extension and run a logistic regression with the dependent
variable CLOS; the explanatory variables treatL and Ph (and their interactions); and our other control variables.
CLOS takes 1 if a subject chooses the option that is subjectively closest to her unavailable aspiration and 0 otherwise.
Ph takes 1 if the task is three+one and 0 if it is a trio task. The variable treatL takes 1 if the data belongs to Treatment
L and 0 otherwise. The variable treatL is found to not interact with the variable Ph (p = 0.626). Dropping that
insignificant interaction term, we find that Ph being 1 (relative to being 0) increases the odds of choosing the
alternative subjectively closest to the aspiration (p = 0.060).
39To see this, we run a logistic regression on the pooled data with dependent variable EUC; independent variables
AvailAlt, treatL, as well as their interaction; and other control variables. EUC takes 1 if a subject chooses the
Euclidean-wise closest option to her unavailable aspiration in a two+one or three+one task and 0 otherwise. AvailAlt
takes 1 if a task is three+one and 0 if it is a two+one task. AvailAlt and treatL are found to not interact (p = 0.811).
40This result is obtained via a logistic regression with the dependent variable REV; independent variables treatL,
TwoPh as well as the interaction of the latter two variables; and other control variables. The variable REV takes 1
whenever the alternative chosen in a two+two or two+one task is different than the one chosen in the corresponding
binary task which is obtained by removing the unavailable option(s) in those tasks from display, and 0 otherwise.
TwoPh takes 1 if a binary and two+two tasks are being compared for reversal and 0 if a binary and two+one task are
being compared. An observation from a task with phantoms is included in this analysis only if one of the phantoms
there is revealed as an aspiration. Analysis shows that TwoPh does not interact with treatL. Regardless of the timing
treatment, a task being two+two (rather than two+one) significantly lowers the odds of reversing the choice from
the corresponding binary task (p = 0.000). Also, the effect of treatL on choice reversal between binary and two+two
tasks is not significant (p = 0.108).
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On the other hand, support for similarity-based choice behavior (with respect to the subjective
distance function) is found to be stronger in the case of two phantoms than in the case of a unique
aspiration phantom. Introduction of the second (non-aspiration) phantom option into an environ-
ment where there already exists an unavailable aspiration significantly increases the odds that the
alternative subjectively closest to the unavailable aspiration is chosen (p = 0.025).41 Despite this,
in choice environments with two unavailable options, the difference between the performance of
the subjective and Euclidean distances in explaining observed choices by means of similarity-based
behavior vanishes. The reason found in the data is similar to the observation we discuss in the
previous extension: a logistic regression analysis shows that, independent of the timing treatment,
the odds that the alternative which is Euclidean-wise closest to the unavailable aspiration is cho-
sen also increases significantly with the addition of a non-aspiration phantom to the environment
(p = 0.003).42
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of our main results by considering binary, trio, and two+one
tasks where each bundle is composed of three types of goods. Unlike in the main design, any
two+one task in the present extension is created by conditionally making the choice of each subject
from a trio task to be unavailable. Therefore, the unavailable alternative in each two+one task
faced by any subject is always her aspiration and subjects with different aspirations face different
two+one tasks. As before, regardless of timing, a significant number of choice reversals are observed
when an unavailable aspiration is introduced into a binary task environment (15.78%, p = 0.000,
bootstrapping). As for the test of similarity-based decision making, the analysis of the present
extension case yields results that are either significantly stronger or not significantly different than
the benchmark ones. For instance, the effect of an unavailable aspiration’s presence on the choice
of the subjectively closest option is found to not differ depending on the alternatives being a
combination of two or three types of consumer goods.43 In addition, as in the benchmark case,
the performance of the subjective distance measure in this extension is again better than that of
the Euclidean distance in explaining observed choices via similarity-based behavior.44 A logistic
41Pooling the relevant observations, we run a logistic regression with the dependent variable CLOS and independent
variables TwoPH and treatL as well as their interactions. For any task with phantom option(s), CLOS takes 1 if the
alternative subjectively closest to the unavailable aspiration is chosen and 0 otherwise. TwoPh takes 1 if the task is
two+two and it takes 0 if the task is two+one. The results show that treatL and TwoPh do not interact with each
other (p = 0.476). Furthermore, treatL has no significant impact on CLOS (p = 0.967).
42To reach this result, we pool the relevant data and run a logistic regression with the dependent variable EUC;
independent variables TwoPH and treatL and their interaction; and other control variables. Independent variables
are defined as before. EUC takes 1 if a subject chooses the Euclideanwise-closest alternative in a task with one or
two phantoms and 0 otherwise. We find that TwoPH does not interact with treatL (p = 0.691)
43We run a logistic regression with the dependent variable CLOS; independent variables Ph, ThAttr, treatL as well
as their interactions; and other control variables. CLOS, treatL, and Ph are defined as before and ThAttr is defined
as follows: It takes 1 if in a task each bundle is composed of three types of goods and it takes 0 if only two types
are good are used. The analysis shows that ThAttr does not have a significant impact on the interaction that exists
between Ph and treatL(p = 0.630). Moreover, ThAttr has no 2-way interaction with either of Ph (p = 161) or treatL
(p = 0.111). Dropping insignificant 2- and 3-way interactions, we conclude that, also in this extension, the odds
that the subjectively closest option is chosen increase significantly with the presence of the unavailable aspiration in
Treatment E (p = 0.000) while the odds do not change significantly in Treatment L (p = 0.471). Moreover, ThAttr
has no significant influence on the choice of the subjectively closest option (p = 0.473).
44Of observed choices in two+one tasks with three types of goods in bundles, in Treatment E 85.85% and 35.85%
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regression analysis reveals that, in Treatment E, the odds that the subjective distance function
performs better than the Euclidean one are significantly higher when three- instead of two- types
of goods are used to define each bundle (p = 0.000) whereas in Treatment L, the magnitude of the
subjective distance’s superior performance over the Euclidean does not significantly differ depending
on whether two or three types of goods are used to express each bundle (p = 0.447).45
9.2 Procedural Details of the Extensions
Questions regarding the second extension where we change the form of choice tasks (the number
of available options, unavailable options, and the number of types of goods in a bundle) were
embedded in Treatments E and L.
For the extension where we change the timing of unavailability, a separate treatment called
Treatment “Later” was run. Below is the instructions for that treatment.
Instructions for Treatment “Later”
This is an experiment in decision making. Thank you for agreeing to participate. Please make
sure your mobile phones are turned off to avoid interruptions during the experiment.
Your participation in this experiment is voluntary but we hope that you will also find the
experiment interesting. You will be compensated for your participation; you will earn a combination
of cash and consumer goods. Your final payoff will include a show-up fee of $5 and the rest will
depend on the choices you have made and on chance.
The experiment will be conducted on the computer screen in front of you. Please do not talk
or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment.
Please follow the instructions carefully. If you have any questions while the experiment is
described, please raise your hand and your question will be answered so everyone can hear. The
problems are not designed to test you. We are only interested in your personal opinion.
The experiment consists of two parts: Part I and Part II. Each part is composed of a series of
decision tasks. At the end of the experiment, one of the decision tasks will be selected randomly
and payment will be made accordingly. Each decision task is equally likely to be selected. Since
you do not know which decision task will be picked, you need to answer all questions in both parts.
The published results of our research will not identify any individual or the choice he or she
made in any way. All records will be linked to an anonymous subject ID only.
We will now discuss the instructions and payment method for tasks from Part I, and then you
will participate in the first part of the experiment. After everyone has completed the first part of
can be explained by the subjective and Euclidean distance, respectively, while in Treatment L respective percentages
are 79.54% and 57.57%. The superiority of the subjective distance over the Euclidean one is significant both in
Treatment E (p = 0.000, bootstrapping) and in Treatment L (p = 0.000, bootstrapping).
45We define the variables EUC and SUB as in the main analysis and drop observations both take the same value.
Then, we pool the relevant data and a logistic regression with SUB as the dependent variable; ThAttr and treatL as
the independent variables (and their interaction); and also other control variables. Variables ThAttr and treatL are
found to interact (p = 0.002).
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the experiment, we will then discuss the instructions and payment method for the second part of
the experiment which you will then take.
PART I: Each decision task consists of two stages:
- In the FIRST stage of a decision task, you will be presented with several bundles of consumer
goods and asked to choose your most preferred bundle among those. To select a bundle, click on
the bundle you prefer and then click submit. Once you submit, you cannot go back and change
your choice in that decision task.
- In the SECOND stage, you will be presented with the same set of bundles as in the first stage,
but this time some of those bundles might be unavailable. Bundles that are unavailable will no
longer be clickable, and you will be asked to choose your most preferred bundle among the available
ones in this new situation. To select a bundle, click on the bundle you prefer and then click submit.
Once you submit, you cannot go back and change your choice in that decision task.
There are no right or wrong answers. We are only interested in the choices you would make
in each given situation. The only right answer is what you would really choose. It is in your best
interest to answer each question truthfully.
Payment Method:
If the decision task randomly selected at the end of the experiment is from Part I, then one
of the two stages of that decision task will be selected randomly as well and, in addition to your
show-up fee of $5, you will be given the option you have chosen in that stage. Please note that
both stages of any decision task are equally likely to be selected.
Example:
R1 - 1st stage: Which of the following bundles do you choose?
A
B
C
D
R1 - 2nd Stage: Notice that two of the bundles from the previous stage are now unavailable.
Which remaining bundle do you choose?
A
B (Unavailable)
C
D (Unavailable)
IT BENEFITS YOU TO CHOOSE YOUR MOST PREFERRED OPTION IN EACH DECI-
SION TASK AND IN EACH STAGE because you don’t know:
1) which bundles will become unavailable in the second stage of a decision task
2) which decision task and which of its stages will be randomly picked at the end of the exper-
iment. Recall that any decision task and any stage is equally likely to be selected.
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Are there any questions?
If there are no questions, please press Continue button and proceed to the first part of the
experiment.
When you finish, please wait for our announcement to start Part 2, which will be started after
everyone has completed the first part of the experiment.
PART II: Each decision task will consist of a set of bundles and you will be provided with one of
them. For every other bundle in that task, you will be asked to state the minimum compensation
in dollars that you would be willing to accept to change from the provided bundle to that bundle.
Here is an example:
Previously, when asked to choose between bundle A and the bundles listed below, you chose bundle
A. Now, suppose that you are given bundle A. Next to each of the bundles listed below, please
enter the minimum compensation (in dollars) you are willing to accept to switch from A to that
bundle, and then click on the Submit button at the end of the page.
B —-
C —-
Notice that, since you will always be provided with your most preferred bundles, the minimum
compensations you will enter should be greater than 0. Minimum compensations can be expressed
in decimals. For example, 7.45 represents $7 and 45 cents. If your minimum compensation is a
whole number, then you do not need to specify the number of cents, you may simply enter that
whole dollar amount.
Again in this part, there are no right or wrong answers. We are only interested in your personal
opinion.
PAYMENT METHOD:
If the decision task randomly selected at the end of the experiment is from Part II, then- in
addition to your $5 show-up fee- you will be paid according to the following rule:
One of the bundles in that randomly selected decision task will be chosen.
If the selected bundle in the task is the one you are provided with, then you will get that bundle.
Otherwise: A market price p* will be chosen randomly between $0.01 and $30. If p* is larger than
or equal to the minimum amount you have stated, then you will leave the option you were provided
with, get the other option instead and also be paid p*. Otherwise, you will keep the option you
own.
Example:
Suppose that the minimum amount that you are willing to accept to switch from bundle A to
bundle B is $3. Then, it is in your best interest to state 3 as your minimum switching price because
of the following reason:
Suppose that you entered the price $6 instead. In this case, if $5 is drawn as the random
switching price at the end of the experiment, you will receive bundle A because the price drawn
was less than the price you specified. However, in truth you were willing to switch for $3, and
hence would have preferred to switch from A to B and received $5. On the other hand, suppose
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that you entered the price $1 instead of your true price of $3. In this case, imagine that $2 is drawn
as the random switching price at the end of the experiment. In this event, you will receive bundle
B and $2, a combination that is worse to you than receiving bundle A because your true minimum
switching price was $3.
Therefore, it is not in your interest to lie upwards or downwards, but rather IT BENEFITS
YOU TO STATE YOUR TRUE MINIMUM COMPENSATION IN EVERY TASK.
Are there any questions? If not, please press Continue button and proceed to Part 2.
When you finish, please raise your hand so that the experimenter can make your payment.
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